Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1978

State of Utah v. Ricky Joe Archuletta : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Rodney S. Page; Robert B. Hansen; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Lyle J. Barnes; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Archuletta, No. 14636 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/419

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

'.

.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-

(

STATE OF UTAH,

j,

LYLE J. BARNES
Villager Professional Building
47 North Main, Suite No. 1
Kaysville, Utah 84037
Attorney for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE------------------ 1
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT----------------------- 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL------------------------------ 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS----------------------------------- 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I: APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
WHEN HE WAS INCARCERATED IN EXCESS OF THIRTY
DAYS FOLLOWING HIS DEMAND FOR AN EARLIER
TRIAL DATE----------------------------------- 6
POINT II: APPELLANT'S CONFESSION WAS
VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY GIVEN AND PROPERLY
RECEIVED AT TRIAL---------------------------- 11
POINT III: ON CROSS-EXAMINATION, AN
UNSOLICITED AND VOLUNTARY STATEMENT BY A
WITNESS THAT THE APPELLANT HAD BEEN IN PRISON,
WHERE SUCH STATEMENT WAS NOT HIGHLIGHTED OR
EMPHASIZED, WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL AND NOT GROUNDS
FOR A NEW TRIAL------------------------------ 14
POINT IV: APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS, INCLUDED WITHIN AND MADE
A PART OF HIS APPELLATE BRIEF, IS UNTIMELY
AND PROPERLY BROUGHT AND THE ARGUMENTS
RAISED THEREIN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THIS
COURT AS PART OF APPELLANT'S APPELLATE BRIEF- 19
A. APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WHEN HE
WAS INCARCERATED IN EXCESS OF THIRTY DAYS
FOLLOWING HIS DEMAND FOR AN EARLIER TRIAL
DATE----------------------------------------- 21
B. APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A TRANSCRIPT
OF TRIAL IN PREPARATION FOR APPEAL, BECAUSE
OF HIS IMPECUNIOSITY, IN VIOLATION OF HIS
RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW-------- 22
CONCLUSION------------------------------------------- 24
CASES CITED
Andreason v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 182, 493 P.2d 1278
(1972)--------------------------------------- 20
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960)------------ 12
Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121
(1967)--------------------------------------- 21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
-i-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page
Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958)-Christensen v. Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d
760 (1951)---------------------------------Davis v. North Carolina, 384 u.s. 737 (1966)-------In re Cameron, 439 P~2d 633, 68 C.2d 487, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 529 (1968)---------------------------Jones v. Smith, Utah, 550 P.2d 194 (1976)----------People v. Dacy, 85 Cal.Rptr. 57, 5 C.A.3d 216 (1970)
Roberts v. Lavallee, 389 u.s. 40 (1967)------------Schad v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 345, 496 P.2d 263
(1972)-------------------------------------State v. Brady, 469 P.2d 77, 105 Ariz. 592 (1970)--State v. Clark, 110 Ariz. 242, 517 P.2d 951 (1976)-State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961)State v. Howard, Utah, 544 P.2d 466 (1975)---------State v. Jones, Utah, 554 P.2d 1321 (1976)---------State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972)
State v. Kazda, Utah, 545 P.2d 190 (1976)----------State v. Lozano, 23 Utah 2d 312, 462 P.2d 710 (1969)
State v. Mason, Utah, 530 P.2d 795 (1975)----------State v. Ortiz, 422 P.2d 355, 77 N.M. 316 (1967)---State v. Peterson, 23 Utah 2d 58, 457 P.2d 532
(1969)-------------------------------------State v. Rasmussen, 18 Utah 2d 201, 418 P.2d 134
(1966)-------------------------------------State v. Rivera, 381 P.2d 584, 94 Ariz. 45 (1963)--State v. Schieving, Utah, 535 P.2d 1232 (1975)-----State v. Smith, 476 P.2d 802, 4 Or.App. 130 (1970)-State v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71, 498 P.2d 357 (1972)Tucker v. State, Nevada, 553 P.2d 951 (1976)-------United States v. Ewell, 383 u.s. 116 (1966)---------

16
16
12
13
20,21
12
23,24
21
13
13
17
11
11
15
18
8,10
16
12,13
17
8,9
14
15
13
11
13
7,8,9,10

STATUTES CITED
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§ 76-6-20~ (1953), as amended-------§ 77-1-8 (6) (1953)------------------§ 77-38-4 (1953)--------------------§ 77-39-5 (1953)---------------------

1
6-9
20
20

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence--------------------- 15
Rule 75, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-------------- 22
United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 12--- 7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-ii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
14636

-vsRICKY JOE ARCHULETTA,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Ricky Joe Archuletta, was convicted on
June 10, 1976, in the Second Judicial District Court, in
and for Davis County, of the offense of Burglary, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953), as amended
(R.51).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On February 18, 1976, appellant was charged by
way of complaint with the violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-202 (1953), as amended; burglary (R.4).

Following

a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of the above
named offense in the Second Judicial District Court, in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Thornley K. Swan, presiding (R.51).

On June 15, 1976,

appellant was sentenced to a term in the Utah State
Prison of not less than one year and no more than
fifteen years (R.55).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the decision
of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Feburary 8, 1976, Johnny and Judy Delgado's home
in Clearfield, Utah, was burglarized. (T.4,12).

Mrs.

Delgado called the police to report the burglary.

When

the police arrived, it was determined that a television,
stereo system and rifle had been stolen (T.4,12,28,33).
Upon further inspection, it was discovered that a bedroom
window had been broken (T.4,12).

A hairbrush was found

among the broken glass on the bedroom floor (T.7,48).
The hairbrush was identified by Johnny Delgado as belonging
to appellant Archuletta (T.17).
At trial, Judy Delgado testified that her husband
and the appellant were cousins and shared a close relationship (T.16).

She further stated that the appellant had

been in their home earlier on the day of the burglary
(February 8, 1976), and that her husband had shown the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
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appellant his new rifle (T.5,6).
Officers Neumeyer and DeRyke testified that
Mr. Delgado was very upset by the burglary and that he
stated that he suspected that the appellant and Ralph Gomez
had committed the burglary (T.29,34).

Before the appellant

was arrested, Mr. Delgado, through his contacts in the
Spanish-American community, provided the police with
valuable information as to the location of the stolen
property (T.34).
Angelo Caburo and Josie Flores,testifying on
behalf of the defense, stated that on the morning of
February 17, 1976, in the company of the appellant, they
purchased a case of beer and went to the Flores' home to
drink (T.58,65).

In the early afternoon, after consuming

much of the beer, the appellant asked Caburo to take him
to the police station, which he and Flores proceeded to do
(T.58,65).

Both Flores and Caburo testified that, when they

arrived at the police station, the appellant was drunk
(T.59,65).
Officer Bud DeRyke testified that he contacted
appellant's mother and requested that the appellant meet
with him on February 17, 1976, at his office in the Clearfield Police Station (T.36).

When Archuletta arrived on

that day, he met with DeRyke, Officer Chadbourne and Randy
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Hunter, secretary (T.37).

DeRyke testified that he and

Officer Chadbourne first gave appellant a Miranda
warning by reading those rights to him several times.
After each of the five statements in the Miranda warning,
the appellant was asked if he understood the substance
of the statement, to which he responded affirmatively
_·, .....

(T. 71).

The police then read to appellant a waiver of
rights form because he informed the officers that he
could not read (T.32,71).

After each statement was

read to appellant, he was asked if he understood the
substance of his rights contained in the statement, to
which he responded affirmatively (T.71,72).
then signed the form (T.37,71).

Appellant

DeRyke testified that

the appellant stated "at least three times that he
understood his rights (T.37, lines 15,16).
DeRyke further testified that he informed
Archuletta that an interpreter would be made available
if he desired, but the appellant responded that "he
could understand English good enough (T.38, line 1).
Officer Chadbourne then proceeded to question
the appellant about the Delgado burglary.
recorded the interview in shorthand (T.73).

Miss Hunter
At the

conclusion of the interview, Miss Hunter read each
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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question and answer back to the appellant and he acknowledged
that the answer he had given was correct in each case (T.73).
The dictation was then typed by Miss Hunter and returned to
Officer Chadbourne.

With the typed statement in hand, Officer

Chadbourne stood alongside the appellant and read each
question and answer to him.

The questions and answers were

read "very slowly, very deliberately", and in each case, the
appellant acknowledged that the answer read was correct (T.73,
74).

The appellant then signed the document (T.74).
Officer DeRyke testified that the appellant exhibited

no "difficulty in understanding the questions or any of the
instructions given to him."

(T.74, lines 20-22).

In his statement given to Officers Chadbourne and
DeRyke, Archuletta admitted breaking into the Delgado residence
through the bedroom window, and, in the company of Ralph Gomez,
stealing a television, stereo system and rifle (T.75).

The

rifle was taken to Gomez's home and the television to a
girl's home in Ogden.

Archuletta then stated that he would

assist the officers in recovering the television, which he
later did (T.76,77).

Finally, the appellant stated that the

last time he had seen his hairbrush was directly before the
Delgado burglary (T.77).
Officers Chadbourne and DeRyke, who interviewed appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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shortly after his arrival at the police station, both
testified that appellant was not drunk, that he walked
steadily and that there was no odor of alcohol about
him (T.70,71,105).

Additional testimony was received

from Officer Glen Parker and Miss Hunter to the effect
that the appellant was not drunk, but appeared composed,
very calm and without any signs of disorientation
(T.84,110).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WHEN HE WAS INCARCERATED IN EXCESS OF
THIRTY DAYS FOLLOWING HIS DEMAND FOR AN EARLIER TRIAL
DATE.
Appellant contends that any criminal defendant who
is held or incarcerated for more than thirty days following
both arraignment and a demand for an earlier trial date,
as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-8(6)
then be tried.

(1953), cannot

Respondent asserts that the delay in the

instant case did not deny appellant his constitutional right
to a speedy trial.
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
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by Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah.
Article 1, Section 12, provides:
"In criminal prosecution, the
accused shall have the right to • • •
a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the County or District in
which the offense is alleged to have
been committed • • • • "
The Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 12,
guarantees of a speedy trial are important safeguards
in the prevention of undue and oppressive incarceration
prior to trial, in the minimization of anxiety and
concern accompanying public accusation and in the
limitation of the possibilities that long delay will
impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
The Utah Legislature has provided a statutory
implementation of the constitutional guarantee to a
speedy trial in Utah Code Ann.§ 77-1-8 (1953):
"In criminal prosecutions, the
defendant is entitled: (6) to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed: and
every defendant in a criminal action
unable to get bail shall be entitled
to a trial within thirty (30) days after
arraignment, if the court is then in session
in such county, otherwise, the trial of
such defendant shall be called on the
next day of the next succeeding session
of the court."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant argues that the thirty day requirement
of Section 77-1-8(6) must be interpreted strictly and
that a criminal defendant is entitled to dismissal if
it is exceeded.

Respondent disagrees and asserts that

Section 77-1-8 is directory and not mandatory.

State v.

Rasmussen, 18 Utah 2d 201, 418 P.2d 134 (1966); State v.
Lozano, 23 Utah 2d 312, 462 P.2d 710 (1969). The criminal
justice system is designed to proceed at a calculated
speed, not only to insure that an accused's ability to
defend himself-is not damaged by unnecessary incarceration and delay, but also to guarantee sufficient time
for defense investigation and trial preparation.

In

United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. at 120, the United States
Supreme Court stated:
"
in large measure because
of the many procedural safeguards provided
an accused, the ordinary procedures for
criminal prosecution are designed to
move at a deliberate pace. A requirement
of unreasonable speed would have a
deleterious effect both upon the rights
of the accused and upon the ability of
society to protect itself. Therefore,
this Court has consistently been of the
view that 'The right of a speedy trial is
necessarily relative.
It is consistent with
delays and depends upon circumstances.
It secures rights to a defendant.
It does
not preclude the rights of public justice.'
Beavers v. Haubert, 198 u.s. 77, 87, /.5
S.Ct. 573, 576, 49 L.Ed. 950.
'Whether
delay in completing a prosecution * * *
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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amounts to an unconstitutional
deprivation of rights depends upon the
circumstances. * * * The delay must not
be purposeful or oppressive.' Pollard v.
United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361, 77 S.Ct.
481, 486, 1 L.Ed.2d 393.
'[T]he essential
ingredient is orderly expedition and
not mere speed.' Smith v. United States,
360 u.s. 1, lo, 79 s.ct. 991, 997,
3 L.Ed.2d 1041."
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the perspective
of Ewell when applying Section 77-1-8.
~'

In State v. Rasmussen,

the Court held that Section 77-1-8(6) was directory,not

mandatory and that "each case must be examined in light of its
own particular facts."

In Rasmussen, the defendant was arrested

on April 3, 1965, and charged on April 5, 1965, followed by a
preliminary hearing on May 14, 1965, being arraigned on June 2,
1965.

A trial date was set for June 15, 1965, but later post-

paned because the trial court had a homicide case in process.
On that day, defendant made an oral motion for dismissal for
lack of a speedy trial, which was denied.

A second date was

set for July 2, 1965, and was postponed because of the trial
judge's illness and hospitalization.

Another trial date was

set for July 21, 1965, which also had to be postponed.

The

trial took place on July 27, 1965, about 45 days after the
request for a speedy trail and motion to dismiss for want
thereof.

The court held that under these circumstances "no

one was intentionally prejudiced by the two-week delay," and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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therefore, defendant was not denied his right to a speedy
trial.

State v. Rasmussen, 418 P.2d at 135.
In State v. Lozano, supra, cited by appellant, this

Court dismissed a case for lack of a speedy trial where
the defendant was held in jail for 135 days after a demand
for a speedy trial, the trial date having been continued
upon motion of the prosecution over the objections of
the defendant.
In the instant case, appellant was arraigned on
March 30, 1976, and trial was set for April 30, 1976 (R.10,
11).

When it was discovered that April 30 was a legal

holiday (Arbor Day),,the matter was stricken from the trial
calendar.

Appellant's attorney filed a demand for a speedy

trial on May 3 (R.14).

The Court then offered a new trial

date to appellant's counsel of June 3 (within the thirty
day period of Section 77-1-8), but appellant's counsel was
unavailable on that date (R.22), and the

matter was then

set for trial on June 9 (R.15), 38 days after appellant's
demand for a speedy trial.
The delay in trial was not caused by the prosecution.
Respondent asserts that there was no prejudicial delay in
appellant's trial and, therefore, the trial court properly
denied appellant's motion for dismissal based upon lack of a
speedy trial.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
APPELLANT'S CONFESSION WAS VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY
GIVEN AND PROPERLY RECEIVED AT TRIAL.
Appellant contends that his statement to the
Clearfield Police concerning his participation in the
Delgado burglary should have been suppressed at trial
because he does not read or write.the English language and
was intoxicated at the time the statement was given.
Respondent notes that this Court has consistently
held that on appeal from a judgment of conviction, it will
view the testimony as a whole in the light most favorable
to the state.

State v. Jones, Utah, 554 P.2d 1321 (1976);

State v. Howard, Utah, 544 P.2d 466 (1975); State v. Wilcox,
28 Utah 2d 71, 498 P.2d 357 (1972).
Testimony received at trial clearly shows that
appellant's confession was made knowingly and voluntarily.
Both Officers DeRyke and Chadbourne read appellant the
Miranda warning and were assured by appellant that he
understood his rights (T.37,71).

The waiver of rights

form was read to appellant several times and he stated
that he understood the content of the form before he
signed it (T.37,71,72).

Finally, appellant's statement

as to his participation in the Delgado burglary was transcribed
and then repeated back to him to check its accuracy.

After

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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time and he again acknowledged that it was correct (T.73,
74).

The police officers also testified that Archuletta

had no difficulty understanding their questions and
responding to them (T.74).
A confession is voluntary when it is the product
of rational intellect and free will. Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199 (1960); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737
(1966).

The above cited testimony reveals that appellant's

confession was made freely and without coercion.

Appellant

understood his rights, waived them and voluntarily provided
the police with information

regarding the Delgado burglary.

Appellant's statement reveals that he broke into the Delgado
home and took from it a television, stereo system and rifle
(T.75,76).

The confession also states that Archuletta did

not believe that he had the Delgado's permission to take the
property (T.76).
Appellant's counsel asserts that because appellant
Archuletta does not read or write the English language, his
statement could not have been made voluntarily and
knowingly.
contention.

Appellant cites no case law supporting this
Decisional law indicates that the inability to

read or write the English language does not render a
confession involuntary and inadmissible.

People v. Dacy,

85 Cal.Rptr. 57, 5 C.A.3d 216 (1970); State v. Ortiz, 422
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

P.2d 355, 77 N.M. 316 (1967); State v. Brady, 469 P.2d 77,
105 Ariz. 592 (1970).
Appellant further contends that he was drunk at
the time he made his statement to the police and that,
therefore, his statement is inadmissible.

Officers

DeRyke, Chadbourne and Parker and Miss Hunter all
testified that appellant was not drunk, did not smell
of alcohol, walked steadily and was not disoriented
during his visit to the police station on February 17,
1976 (T.70,71,84,105,110).

Several cases have held that

the fact an individual has been drinking, even to the extent
that he is under the influence of intoxicants, does not
necessarily mean that he cannot understand advice and
cannot be bound by his subsequent conduct in deciding to
waive the right of which he is advised.

State v. Smith,

476 P.2d 802, 4 Or. App. 130 (1970); Tucker v. State,
Nevada, 553 P.2d 951 (1976); State v. Clark, 110 Ariz.
242, 517 P.2d 1238 (1974); In re Cameron, 439 P.2d 633,
68 C.2d 487, 67 Cal.Rptr. 529 (1968).
reason of extreme intoxication

However, if by

a confession cannot be

said to be the product of a rational intellect and free
will, it is not admissible.
Cameron, supra.

State v. Smith, supra; In re

In the instant case, appellant has failed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to show that he was intoxicated to an extent sufficient to
render his confession inadmissible.
Finally, appellant cites State v. Rivera, 381 P.2d
584, 94 Ariz. 45 (1963), contending that an interpreter should
have been provided at the time of his confession.
is distinguishable from the present case.

Rivera

In Rivera, the

appellant did not read, speak or understand the English
language.

In the instant case, appellant spoke and under-

stood English.

Appellant felt that an interpreter was not

necessary, as he stated to Officer DeRyke (T.38).

Further-

more, in the instant case, testimony was received by the
trial court indicating that the appellant had no trouble
understanding and participating in the interview (T.74).
Viewing the testimony in a light most favorable
to the decision of the lower court, it is clear that the
appellant understood his rights and knowingly and voluntarily
chose to waive them.
POINT II
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION, AN UNSOLICITED AND VOLUNTARY
STATEMENT BY A WITNESS THAT THE APPELLANT HAD BEEN IN
PRISON, WHERE SUCH STATEMENT WAS NOT HIGHLIGHTED OR
EMPHASIZED, WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL AND NOT GROUNDS FOR A
NEW TRIAL.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-14may contain errors.

Appellant argues that a statement by his mother,
during the course of cross-examination, was prejudicial
and should form the basis for a new trial:
"Q. I see now, Ricky is over
30 years of age. Has he worked at
all during this period of time?
A. Yah. Not too much, because
he was, he was in prison." (T.117, lines
22-25).
Appellant claims that this evidence had the effect
of tainting his character and securing his conviction.
Respondent concedes that Rule 47, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1953), prohibits adnission of evidence concerning
a trait of an accused's character as tending to prove
his guilt or innocence of the offense charged.

The Rule

also states that evidence of other crimes should not be
brought in for the purpose of disgracing a defendant or
showing a propensity to commit crimes.

State v. Schieving,

Utah, 535 P.2d 1232 (1975); State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326,
495 P.2d 1265 (1972).

Respondent asserts, however, that the

above-quoted testimony did not violate the intent and
purpose of Rule 47, and was not brought into evidence for
the purpose of disgracing appellant or showing a propensity
to commit crime.

The testimony was proper and should be

allowed for any of· the following reasons:
1.

Appellant failed to object to the introduction

of the supposedly prejudicial evidence at the time it was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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offered at trial.

This Court has consistently ruled that an

appellant cannot complain on appeal of the admissibility of
testimony to which he failed to object at trial.
Child,

Child v.

8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958); Christensen v.

Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951).
Appellant argues that no objection was made at
trial because it would only have dramatized the testimony
in the minds of the jury and that even if he had objected,
the only remedy available to the court was an instruction striki.
the testimony from the record and from the minds of the jury.
Appellant contends that such an instruction is of questionable
value and utility.

Yet this Court has stated that when improper I

I

testimony is produced, an instruction by the judge explaining

I

the improriety of the testimony and urging the jury not to
"indulge any bias or prejudice" against the defendant because
of the testimony is sufficient to prevent prejudice and
injustice.
2.

State v. Mason, Utah, 530 P.2d 795, 798 (1975).
The testimony of appellant's mother was competent,

relevant and served a legitimate purpose.

In State v. Mason,

supra, this Court held::
"
• if there is some legitimate
purpose to be served by evidence which is
otherwise competent and relevant, the
fact that it may also show the admission
of another crime will not render it
inadmissible." Id. at 797.
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Appellant's mother had been questioned by the prosecutor
about appellant's home life, education and work experience.
Such testimony was relevant to help establish those
experiential factors which would provide the jury
with information as to appellant's language skills; a
matter at issue at trial.

The fact that the appellant

had been in prison would tend to show that he had had
experiences which would help develop his English language
skills beyond those of his Spanish speaking home and
community.
3.

The challenged testimony was not directly

solicited nor thereafter emphasized by the prosecution.
The prosecutor did not ask the witness any direct
questions about the appellant's prior criminal involvement
or prison experience.

The prosecution was pursuing a

relevant line of questioning regarding appellant's
background as a means of

elucidatinq.his language skills.

The challenged testimony was unsolicited and only
indirectly responsive to the prosecutor's question.

The

prosecutor in the instant matter did not question the
witness about prior criminal involvement, as did
prosecutors in prior cases where this Court has held such
testimony to be inadmissible.

State v. Peterson, 23

Utah 2d 58, 457 P.2d 532 (1969); State v. Dickson, 12
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challenged testimony was not emphasized nor highlighted
in any way.

The transcript of the trial proceedings

reveals that the prosecutor personally made no mention
of the appellant's previous prison term and did not seek
to encourage or request the witness to elaborate
Instead, the prosecutor questioned

fu~ther.

the witness more

specifically about the appellant's past work experience
(T.117, lines 22-30).

Thus, it is evident that the

questioned testimony was not highlighted nor reiterated and
that the prosecution made no attempt to misuse the testimony
of appellant's mother.
In this context, respondent submits

that

Pricilla Flores' testimony was harmless and not prejudicial
to appellant.
4.

State v. Kazda, Utah, 545 P.2d 190 (1976).

Prior testimony had already revealed that

appellant had served a prison term.

On re-direct examina-

tion, appellant's own witness announced that appellant had
previously been in prison:

"BY MR. BARNES:
Q. Do you have any knowledge
concerning your brother's ability to
read and write.
A. He don't know how to read
or write.
Q.
How do, lyou know?
A. Because I have wrote him some
letters for his friends up when he got
out of prison."
(T. 68, lines 4-10) •
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Where appellant's own witness previously announced
that appellant has been in prison, testimony received
on subsequent cross-examination about appellant's prison
term cannot be deemed prejudicial to an extent sufficient
to establish grounds for a new trial.
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
INCLUDED WITHIN AND MADE A PART OF HIS APPELLATE BRIEF, IS
UNTIMELY AND IMPROPERLY BROUGHT AND THE ARGUMENTS RAISED
THEREIN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT AS PART OF
APPELLANT'S APPELLATE BRIEF.
In Point IV of appellant's brief to this Court, he
petitions the Court for habeas corpus relief (page 13).
Said relief is requested for two reasons:

(1) the trial

court did not have jurisdiction because it failed to bring
appellant to trial within 30 days of his request for an
earlier trial date, and (2) because appellant's impecuniosity
prevented him from obtaining a transcript for 15 months,
he was denied equal protection of the law.
Respondent asserts that appellant's petition for
habeas corpus relief is unt.mely and improper for either
of the following two reasons and that the points raised
therein should be reviewed as part of this Court's
consideration of appellant's appeal.
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1.

The judgment in this case was signed by the

trial judge June 16, 1976 (R.61), and the motion for a
new trial was filed timely, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4 (1953),
on June 18, 1976 (R.59), but was never called up for
disposition.

Thereafter, some 17 months later, appellant

petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-5 (1953), provides that an
appeal may be taken within one month after notice of the
denial of a motion for a new trial. Since no ruling has
ever been made on the motion for a new trial, said motion
is still pending; the time for appeal has not expired and
an application for a writ of habeas corpus is "moot."
Jones v. Smith, Utah, 550 P.2d 194 (1976).
In Jones v. Smith, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held:
"It appears to us that the time
for appeal had not expired, since no
ruling had been made on the motion for
a new trial. Either party could have
called the motion to the attention of
the court and had a ruling made thereon."
Id. at 195.
2.

After an accused has been convicted of a crime,

any claimed error or defect is required to be corrected by
appeal within the time provided by law.
27 Utah 2d 182, 493 P.2d 1278 (1972).

Andreason v. Turner,
This Court has

consistently held that matters properly heard on appeal
cannot be used as a basis for granting a writ of habeas
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corpus.

Jones v. Smith, supra; Ainslie v. Smith, Utah,

531 P.2d 864 (1975); Schad v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 345,
496 P.2d 263 (1972); Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284,
431 P.2d 121 (1967).

The matters presented in the

application for a writ of habeas corpus are all proper
for consideration on appeal, and should be presented and
resolved with this appeal.
A.

APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WHEN HE WAS
INCARCERATED IN EXCESS OF THIRTY DAYS
FOLLOWING HIS DEMAND FOR AN EARLIER TRIAL
DATE.

In subpart 1 of Point IV of appellant's brief
(page 14), appellant raises the identical issue argued in
Point I of his brief (page 6), alleging additionally only
that such argument is proper in an application for a writ
of habeas corpus.

Respondent has previously shown that

habeas corpus relief is not proper at this stage of
these proceedings.

Respondent submits, therefore, that

appellant was properly tried and convicted ;and was not
prejudiced because trial was not had within thirty days
of his motion for an earlier trial date, as argued in
Point I of this brief (see Point I, page 6).
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B.

APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A 'I'HANSCRIPT OF
TRIAL IN PREPARATIOH FOR APPEAL, BECAUSE
OF HIS IMPECUNIOSITY, IN VIOLATION OF
HIS RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

Appellant contends that he suffered as a result
of his inability to pay for a transcript of trial.
Respondent asserts that appellant was provided with a
transcript of trial in preparation for appeal and that
the delay in obtaining a transcript was not prejudicial.
On June 16, 1976, appellant was sentenced to
not less than one year and not more than fifteen years
in the Utah State Prison (R.61).

On June 17, 1976,

counsel for appellant filed a notice of appeal (R.57),
and notice of withdrawal (R.58), with accompanying
motion (R.57).
On July 7, 1976, Archuletta filed a notice of
appeal, prose (R.63).
On March 3, 1977, designation of record on appeal
and appellant's affidavit of impecuniosity were filed
(R.67,71).

However, because of the failure to prosecute

this appeal, the time prescribed by Rule 75, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure (1953), for filing designation of record
on appeal had expired necessitating appellant's motion for
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extension of time for filing designation of record on
appeal, dated March 3, 1977 (R.77).

The Second Judicial

District Court granted appellant's motion for extension
of time on March 15, 1977, and filed its order July 21,
1977 (R. 73).
It is obvious that a transcript of trial could not
be prepared until the court granted appellant's motion for
an extension because of the time requirements of Rule 75.
Once the court granted appellant's motion he was free to
request a transcript, which he did on August 5, 1977 (R.75).
The transcript was provided on September 27, 1977 (R.77).
Respondent asserts that the delay in obtaining
a transcript was the result of the delay in proceeding with
the appeal both by appellant and his attorney and not the
result of appellant's impecuniosity.

Respondent further

asserts that a transcript was provided appellant and was
done in a timely manner following the belated designation
of transcript (R.75).
Appellant cites Roberts v. Lavallee, 389 U.S. 40
(1967), in support of his contention of sufficiency and
prejudice.

Respondent notes that Roberts is readily

distinguished from the case at bar.

Roberts was denied

a free transcript of a preliminary hearing.

In the

present matter, Archuletta was never denied a transcript,
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but was provided one upon a final, proper request.

The

prejudice suffered by Roberts in preparation for trial
due to the lack of the transcript of the preliminary
hearing, does not exist in the instant case because
appellant has had access to the trial transcript in
preparation of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Respondent avers that appellant was not denied his
constitutional right to a speedy trial when he was
incarcerated in excess of thirty days following his demand
for an ealier trial date.

Furthermore, appellant's

confession was voluntarily and knowingly given and properly
received at trial.

During trial, an unsolicited and

voluntary statement, made by a witness on cross-examination,
that the appellant had been in prison, where such statement
was not highlighted nor emphasized, was not prejudicial
and not grounds for a new trial.
Finally, appellant's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, included within and made a part of his appellate
brief, is untimely and improperly brought and the arguments
raised therein should be considered by this Court as part
of appellant's appellate brief.
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Based upon the above cited authority and
argument, respondent prays that this Court affirm the
decision of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

-25-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

